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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the United States joined the World Trade Organization
(WTO),' and thereby agreed to resolve disputes in accordance with the
WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (DSU). 2 Accordingly, when the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) adopts the finding of a Dispute Settlement Panel
(Panel) or Appellate Body that a federal or state law is in conflict with
the WTO Agreement, this judgment imposes a binding international ob-
ligation on the United States to remedy the conflict.'
Despite the fact that the WTO Agreement has clearly fulfilled its
promise of creating high-wage jobs in the export sector and contributing
to overall economic growth,4 it has increasingly come under attack by a
1. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization in Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1144-1154 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226-1227 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
3. As will be explained in greater detail in Part II infra, the judgment of the WTO Panel
or Appellate Body has no effect in domestic U.S. law, and creates only an international obliga-
tion under the WTO Agreement.
4. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 16 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3773, 3778. At the time it enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Congress described
the agreements as
the broadest, most comprehensive trade agreements in history ... They are vital to
our national interest and to economic growth, job creation, and an improved stan-
dard of living for all Americans. These agreements, by lowering tariff and other
barriers to international trade and investment, will lead to increased levels of world
and U.S. output, trade, real income, savings, investments, and consumption.
Id. Studies confirm that these goals have been realized.
Jobs supported by American exports grew by 1.4 million between 1994 and 1998
(latest data), with jobs supported by goods exports paying about 13% to 16% above
the U.S. national average... Academic studies estimate an annual GDP gain for the
U.S. from the Uruguay Round of $27 billion to $37 billion (in 1992 dollars with
full implementation of the agreement). These estimated gains still underestimate the
effect of the Round on GDP-the studies take incomplete or no account of the cuts
in non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, of the benefits of rules changes,
or of the growth effects of more open markets.
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE WTO AND U.S. ECONOMIC
GROWTH (March 2, 2000) at http://www.ustr.gov/wto/wtofact2.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
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diverse coalition of interest groups and non-governmental organizations
concerned with labor and environmental standards, human rights,
consumer safety and health, and the potential loss of national and state
sovereignty. While the riots in Seattle in November 1999 are the most
dramatic evidence of opposition to the WTO, since its inception
academic commentators have pointed out the dangers and defects of the
global trading regime established by the WTO.
In this Note, I address the concerns of one aspect of this academic
commentary-the claim that the WTO Agreement may cause a tectonic
shift in domestic regulatory power, away from the states and toward the
federal government and/or the WTO.' I argue that while the concerns
about the loss of national sovereignty are exaggerated, there is a very
real threat to the sovereignty of the States.6 Congress was aware of this
5. Some commentators are primarily concerned with potential loss of state sovereignty
to the federal government. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Vil-
lage, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (1994). Friedman argues that one of the primary functions
of the WTO is to remove non-tariff trade barriers, in part through the "harmonization" of fed-
eral and state laws that affect international commerce.
This process of harmonization will have an important impact on American federal-
ism. In part, non-uniformity is inherent in the idea of American federalism-the
notion that fifty different states and numerous local governments can go their own
way in developing regulatory frameworks ... [W]e are on the front end of a new
wave of nationalizing, this one brought about through international pressures. And
with this latest wave will come even more pressure to 'harmonize,' and a concomi-
tant pressure to reduce state autonomy.
Id. See also Joseph A. Wilson, Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Preserving
State Sovereignty, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 401 (1997); Samuel C. Straight, GATT and
NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45
DUKE L.J. 216 (1995); Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45 (1998). Other authors have noted that the WTO Agreement may
result in a loss of U.S., as well as state, sovereignty. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Lost Sover-
eignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427
(1995); Patrick Tangney, The New Internationalism: The Cession of Sovereign Competences to
Supranational Organizations and Constitutional Change in the United States and Germany,
21 YALE J. INT'L L. 395 (1996).
6. As of the writing of this Note, the threat to state sovereignty has not yet materialized.
Of the 35 complaints filed against the United States by other countries, only one concerned a
state law-Massachusetts' Act Regulating State Contracts .with companies doing Business
with Burma (Myanmar), which the European Union and Japan alleged violated the Govern-
ment Procurement Agreement-and none has been found by a panel to conflict with the WTO
Agreement. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22A-22M, 40F /2 (2000); Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex WTO Agreement, Annex 4,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 31 (1994). A Panel was estab-
lished on October 21, 1998, but was subsequently suspended on February 10, 1999. See
Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes,
10 1 VI.(3)(a) (Sept. 1, 1999) at http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm (last viewed
November 15, 2001). The Supreme Court has subsequently determined that Massachusetts'
law was implicitly pre-empted by a subsequent federal law governing sanctions on Burma, the
Federal Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act. Crosby v.
Summer 20011]
Michigan Journal of International Law
danger and included a variety of provisions designed specifically to pro-
tect state sovereignty from federal encroachment in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA),7 the federal legislation incorporating the WTO
Agreement into U.S. law. These safeguards are embodied in URAA sec-
tion 102(b). Rather than automatically preempting state laws that a WTO
Panel or Appellate Body has found to be in conflict with the WTO
Agreement, section 102(b) gives the states an opportunity to present
their case before a U.S. court, whom the statute commands to make an
independent final determination as to the existence of a conflict. But an
erroneous interpretation of two of section 102(b)'s key provisions-the
judicial independence mandated by section 102(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) and
the preemptive scope of section 102(b)(2)(A)-may deprive the States of
the safeguards Congress put in place, and could cause an unintended
shift of regulatory and interpretive authority towards the executive
branch of the federal government. Preempting state laws that conflict
with the WTO Agreement is a two-step process. First, the WTO DSB
must adopt a WTO Panel or Appellate Body report finding that the state
law in question conflicts with a provision of the WTO Agreement.8 Sec-
ond, the United States, through the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), must bring a separate action against the state in federal court
for the purpose of invalidating the statute pursuant to section
102(b)(2)(A). The URAA's legislative history states that the URAA does
''not automatically preempt or invalidate State laws that do not conform
to the agreements even if there is a dispute settlement finding that the
State measure is inconsistent,"9 but it does not specify the standard fed-
eral courts are to use to determine whether the URAA preempts a
challenged state law.
The determination of the appropriate standard involves two separate,
but interrelated, issues. First, to what degree should courts defer to the
USTR's determination that a conflict exists? Second, what is the
preemptive scope of URAA section 102(b)(2)(A)? With respect to the
Nat'l Foreign Trade Counsel, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). See also Foreign Operations, Export Fi-
nancing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to
167 (1997).
7. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 1, 19 U.S.C. § 3501, et seq. (1994) [hereinafter
URAA].
8. These agreements are contained in Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement. Annex 1A is by
far the largest, containing GATT 1994, and 12 other substantive agreements on trade in goods.
Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1154-1166 (1994). Annex lB is the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
IB, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1167-1196 (1994). Annex IC is the Trade Related Intellectual Property
(TRIPS). Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197-1225 (1994).
9. H.R. REP. No. 103-826 (I), at 25 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3797.
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first question, there are three possible levels of deference: (i) no
deference, which is the standard courts pay to ordinary litigants, (ii)
Skidmore deference, whereby an agency's interpretation has non-
binding, persuasive authority, or (iii) Chevron deference, according to
which the agency's interpretation is binding on courts so long as the
agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority. There are
also three possible preemptive scopes that section 102(b)(2)(A) may
allow: (i) conflict preemption, which invalidates state laws in cases
where it is physically impossible to comply with both federal and state
laws, (ii) obstacle preemption, which preempts state laws that frustrate
the purpose of the federal law or that stand as an obstacle to the policies
underlying the federal law, and (iii) occupation of the field preemption
(field preemption), which invalidates all state legislation in fields
exclusively regulated by federal law. I contend that Skidmore deference
and obstacle preemption are the appropriate standards.
In Part II, I describe the process of successive challenges to state
law, first, under the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO
Agreement, and second, under U.S. domestic law. In Part III, I outline
the differences between the various standards of deference and contend
that Congress did not intend federal courts to give the USTR binding,
Chevron deference. The USTR is instead owed Skidmore deference, be-
cause, as the agency charged with setting international trade policies, it
is in a better position than courts are to determine whether the state law
in question frustrates those policies. In Part IV, I argue that, of the three
preemption standards, only obstacle preemption would make the URAA
sufficiently flexible to achieve its broad purpose of liberalizing interna-
tional trade in goods, services, and intellectual property.
II. PROTECTION OF STATE LAWS BY URAA § 102(b)
The unifying purpose of URAA section 102 is to preserve U.S. sov-
ereignty by ensuring that appropriate organs of the federal government
make the final determination as to how the United States will comply
with its international obligations. While section 102(b) provides a variety
of mechanisms to protect state laws that conflict with the WTO Agree-
ment, it is not designed to allow state interests to frustrate U.S.
international trade policy or to limit the authority of the federal govern-
ment to implement and coordinate its policy objectives.
First, I give an overview of the rules and procedures that govern the
WTO's dispute settlement process. Second, I describe the effect of the
WTO Agreement in and on U.S. law. Finally, I discuss the provisions of
URAA section 102(b), outlining the procedures to be followed in the
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event that a WTO Panel or Appellate Body finds that a state law conflicts
with the WTO Agreement: (i) the federal-state consultations required by
section 102(b)(1)(C), (ii) congressional oversight of consultations and
lawsuits between the USTR and affected state government(s) contained
in section 102(b)(2)(C), and (iii) USTR legal challenges to state laws
pursuant to § 102(b)(2)(A).
A. WTO DSB Proceedings
One of the primary differences between the WTO Agreement and the
former GATT treaty is the creation of the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB),' ° which has the power to resolve disputes among Member States.
The DSB itself does not directly adjudicate disputes; instead, it does so
by deciding whether to approve or reject Panel or Appellate Body re-
ports. The DSU contains the rules and procedures that the DSB, Panels
and the Appellate Body are to follow in resolving disputes."
"The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system."'2
Its function is to ensure Member State compliance with the terms of the
covered agreements, including in its jurisdiction regulations enacted by
regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of Mem-
ber States. 3
The DSU provides a variety of mechanisms for settling disputes
among Member States, including negotiation, arbitration, judicial pro-
ceedings in front of a Panel, appellate review, and finally, the imposition
of sanctions. There are nine separate steps leading from the initial com-
plaint to the suspension of concessions from the offending nation.
10. See DSU art. 2(1).
11. See id. art. 1(1).
12. Id. art. 3(2).
13. See WTO Agreement, Annex IA, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Un-
derstanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1163 (1994).
Each Member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of all pro-
visions of GATT 1994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be available
to it to ensure such observance by regional and local governments and authorities
within its territory. The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as
elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked in
respect of measures affecting its observance taken by regional or local governments
or authorities within the territory of a Member. When the Dispute Settlement Body
has ruled that a provision of GATT 1994 has not been observed, the responsible
Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its
observance. The provisions relating to compensation and suspension of concessions
or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been possible to secure such ob-
servance.
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First, the disputing parties are required to consult with one another
and attempt to reach a negotiated solution.'" Second, if this fails, the Di-
rector-General of the WTO can offer to mediate, but parties are not
bound to accept the Director-General's decision.'5 Negotiation and arbi-
tration are the preferred means of settling disputes."
Third, if consultation fails to produce a negotiated solution within 60
days, the parties have a right to demand that a Panel be established."
Fourth, the Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the
parties. The parties may oppose nominations for compelling reasons.
Fifth, if the parties cannot agree on the panelists, the Director-General
may appoint a Panel on his own authority.'8 Sixth, the terms of reference
must be determined.' 9
Seventh, the parties present written arguments to the Panel.2° Other
Member States may intervene, but the Panel considers only issues raised
by the principal parties. Proceedings are not public. After deliberation,
the Panel presents its conclusions and legal analysis. The Panel report
should normally be issued within six to eight months after establishment
of the Panel. Eighth, Panel reports are to be adopted automatically unless
there is a unanimous vote by the DSB not to adopt the Panel report.2' The
adoption of binding and automatic judgments is a radical departure from
the previous GATT regime, where collective action against offending
nations could be vetoed by any nation, including the nation threatened
with sanctions. This allowed the U.S. government to protect offending
14. See DSU art. 4. Additionally, "[w]hen a WTO member requests consultations with
the United States... concerning whether the law of a State is inconsistent with the obligations
undertaken by the United States in any of the Uruguay Round Agreements" the USTR must
notify Governor or the Governor's designee of the affected State(s) within seven days. URAA,
19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(l)(C)(i). Furthermore, the USTR must consult with the representatives of
the affected State(s) within 30 days after receiving such a request. Id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(ii).
15. See DSU art. 5.
16. "The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a
dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the cov-
ered agreements is clearly to be preferred." Id. art. 3(7).
17. See id. art. 6. The panel is to be established unless there is a consensus against it,
which cannot be formed where a complaining party refuses to join the rest of the Members. If
the dispute involves a state law, the USTR must inform the affected state(s) within seven days
of the demand for establishment of a Panel. URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iii)(I-II).
18. See DSU art. 8.
19. The standard terms of reference are the following: "To examine, in the light of the
relevant provisions in (name of covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the
matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document ... and to make such findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
that/those agreement(s)" Id. art. 7. See also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 342 (3d ed. 1995).
20. See DSU art. 12.
21. See id. art. 16.
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state regulations by providing the single dissenting vote to prevent the
22imposition of sanctions
Ninth, the parties may seek appellate review of the Panel report by
the Appellate Body. 23 This body is made up of seven persons appointed
for four years. The Appellate Body sits in panels of three judges to hear
each particular case. It is limited to considering issues of law and
normally takes 60 days or 90 days maximum to give its report. This
decision is also automatically adopted, unless there is a consensus
against adoption.
Finally, concessions may be suspended for noncompliance with
Panel or Appellate Body reports. 4 The losing respondent is required to
indicate what actions it plans to take to implement the Panel's recom-
mendations within a reasonable period of time. 2 Normally, this will not
exceed 15 months.2 6 "If the recommendations are not implemented, the
prevailing party may be. entitled to seek compensation or the authority to
suspend concessions previously made to that member."27 Suspension of
concessions is authorized automatically in the absence of implementa-
tion or compensation, unless the DSB votes unanimously against
suspension. 8 The withdrawal of a nonconforming measure is preferred to
compensation or suspension of concessions; suspension of concessions
is to be used only as a last resort.29
22. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 406.
23. See DSU art. 17. The USTR must notify the affected State(s) within seven days after
a WTO member gives notice that it will appeal a Panel report. URAA, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512(b)(1)(C)(iii)(I).
24. See DSU art. 22.
25. Id. art. 21(3).
26. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 344.
27. Id.
28. See DSU art. 22(6).
29. In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settle-
ment mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are
found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements. The provision
of compensation should be resorted to only if immediate withdrawal of the measure is imprac-
ticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measure, which is
inconsistent with a covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to
the Member invoking the Dispute Settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the
application of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements on a discrimina-
tory basis vis-A-vis the other Member, subject to the authorization by the DSB of such
measures. Id. art. 3(7).
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B. Effect of WTO Agreement and DSB
Decision in U.S. Domestic Law
The relationship between international law and U.S. domestic law is
described as 'dualist.' 30 When the United States enters into an interna-
tional agreement, the obligations created by it are binding on the United
States as a nation.3' Unless the agreement is 'self-executing,' the agree-
ment has no effect in domestic law until it has been 'incorporated' into
U.S. law.3" If the required implementing legislation has not been adopted
or the implementing legislation is inconsistent with the international
agreement, the United States is bound by the terms of the international
agreement.33 Even though only the implementing act has legal force,
courts are to, if possible, construe the implementing act so that it will not
conflict with the international agreement.34
The WTO Agreement is not 'self executing' and has no effect in U.S.
domestic law apart from its implementing legislation, the URAA. 35 The
President negotiated and signed the WTO Agreement pursuant to "Fast
30. "In a dualist state, international treaties are part of a separate legal system from that
of the domestic law (hence a 'dual' system). Therefore, a treaty is not part of the domestic law,
at least not directly." JACKSON, supra note 19, at 126. "The question of whether a treaty has
direct domestic law effect is, under United States law ... a question of whether the treaty is
'self-executing' and purports directly by its own terms to give rights to individual citizens,
rather than simply imposing the international legal obligation upon the national government to
effectuate those rights." Id. at 128.
31. "International law and international agreements of the United States are law of the
United States and supreme over the law of the several States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987).
32. See id.
(3) Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law
and to international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-
self-executing' agreement will not be given effect in the absence of neces-
sary implementation.
(4) An international agreement of the United States is 'non-self-executing' if
the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation.
Id.
33. See id. § 321. "Every international agreement in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith." See also id. § 115(1)(b) ("That a rule of inter-
national law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic law does
not relieve the United States of its international obligations or of the consequences of a viola-
tion of that obligation").
34. When domestic law and international agreement relate to the same subject, the courts
and the Executive Branch "will endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both." Id.
§ 115 cmt. a.
35. "The WTO Agreement and other Uruguay Round agreements ... are not self-
executing and thus their legal effect in the United States is governed by implementing legisla-
tion." S. REP. No. 103-412, at 21 (1994).
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Track" authority delegated to him by Congress.36 The terms of "Fast
Track" authorization manifest the above-mentioned intent that the WTO
Agreement would not have any effect in U.S. law unless and until Con-
gress approved the implementing legislation.37 Congress also expressed
this intention in the statutory text. Section 102(a) provides:
(a) Relationship of agreements to United States law
(1) United States law to prevail in conflict
No Provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor
the application of any such provision to any person or circum-
stances, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States
shall have effect.
(2) Construction
Nothing in this Act shall be construed-
(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States ......
The legislative history explains that the intent of section 102(a)
is to ensure that all changes in federal law due to conflicts with the
WTO Agreement, whether statutory or regulatory, will be
specifically enacted by Congress" or through normal agency proce-
36. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §§ 1102-1103, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2902-2903 (1994).
37.
The Uruguay Round agreements cannot enter into force for the United States and
become binding as a matter of domestic law unless the President meets the re-
quirements specified under section 1102 and 1103 for consultation with the
Congress and implementing legislation approving the agreement and any changes
in U.S. statutes are enacted into law.
H.R. REP. No. 103-826 (I), at 18 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3790. These
requirements are: (1) Before signing the agreement, the President must consult with the con-
gressional committees having jurisdiction over subject matters affected by the agreement.
(2) 120 days before signing an international agreement, the President must notify Congress of
his intent to enter into an agreement. The Executive must then submit a reasonably complete
draft of the agreement so that Congress can have input into the negotiations. (3) The President
must submit to Congress a copy of the agreement, a draft implementing bill, and a statement
of administrative action intended to implement the agreement, an explanation of how the bill
changes or affects existing law, and why such changes are required. (4) Committees have up to
45 legislative days to report the implementing legislation. (5) Each House will vote on the bill
within 15 legislative days after implementing legislation is reported out of committee. No
amendments are allowed. See id. at 18-19.
38. URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a).
39. See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action (SAA),
H.R. REP. No. 103-826(l), at 670 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4050.
Section 102(a)(l) clarifies that no provision of a Uruguay Round agreement will be
given effect under domestic law if it is inconsistent with federal law, including pro-
visions of federal law enacted or amended by the bill ... [T]he section reflects the
[Vol. 22:735
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dures.40 Congress thereby ensured that U.S. sovereignty was not sacri-
ficed through accession to the WTO.4'
If the DSB adopts a Panel or Appellate Body report finding that a
state law conflicts with the WTO Agreement, this imposes an interna-
tional obligation on the United States to bring the offending state law
into compliance. 2 Such a finding, however, does not automatically in-
validate or preempt the challenged state law. "In all cases, following a
panel report, the DSU leaves to the discretion of the United States any
change in federal or state law and the manner in which any such change
may be implemented-whether through the adoption of legislation, a
change in regulation, judicial action, or otherwise.4 3 In response to an
adverse Panel or Appellate Body report involving a state law or regula-
tion, the U.S. Government has five options: (1) Congress may
legislatively preempt the state law, (2) the USTR can seek a negotiated
solution with the State, whereby the State voluntarily changes the of-
fending law or regulation, pursuant to the federal-state consultations
provisions in 102(b)(1)(C), (3) the United States may do nothing and
accept sanctions, (4) Congress may withdraw the U.S. from the
GAT[/WTO, 4 or (5) the USTR may bring an action in federal court for
the purpose of preempting the conflicting state law pursuant to section
102(b)(2)(A). The application of this final option is the subject of this
Note. The following section outlines the preconditions for and .the pro-
cedures governing legal challenges.
Congressional view that necessary changes in federal statutes should be specifically
enacted rather than provided for in a blanket preemption of federal statutes by those
agreements.
Id.
40. See id. "[If a change in regulation is required, [the Administration would need to]
follow normal agency procedures for amending regulations." Id. See also id. at 1032. "[P]anel
reports do not provide legal authority for federal agencies to change theii regulations or pro-
cedures or refuse to enforce particular laws or regulations, such as those related to human,
animal or plant health, or the environment." Id.
41. Id. at 659. "U.S. sovereignty is fully protected under the WTO Agreement.... The
WTO will have no power to change U.S. law .... Moreover, as explained in greater detail in
this Statement in connection with the Dispute Settlement Understanding, WTO dispute settle-
ment panels will not have any power to change U.S. law or order such a change." Id.
42. See DSU art. 22(9). "When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered agree-
ment has not been observed, the responsible Member shall take such reasonable measures as
may be available to it to ensure its observance." Id.
43. SAA, H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 1032-33 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4040,4318.
44. See WTO Agreement, art. XV, 33 I.L.M. 1125; URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3535.
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C. URAA § 102. Protection of State Laws
from Adverse DSB Decisions
1. Cooperation and Consultation Provisions
URAA section 102(b)(1)(C) requires the USTR to consult with the
affected state government(s) and to allow the state government(s) to par-
ticipate in formulating the U.S. position, defending the affected state law
before a Panel or the Appellate Body, and in determining the U.S. re-
sponse to adverse Panel or Appellate Body reports.45 First, the USTR
must notify state governments within seven days of a request for consul-
tations by another Member State 6 or the establishment of a Panel
regarding that state's law." Second, the USTR must initiate consultations
with that state's government within 30 days of receiving such a request.48
Third, the USTR must provide the affected state(s) with the opportunity
to advise and assist it in preparing factual information and argumentation
for presentations by the United States in consultations or proceedings
before a Panel or the Appellate Body. 9
Finally, the USTR must consult with the affected state(s) to develop
a "mutually agreeable response" to an adverse Panel or Appellate Body
report.50 Section 102(b)(1) requires the USTR to consult with the af-
fected state government(s) in order to reach a negotiated solution
whereby the state voluntarily brings its laws into compliance with the
WTO Agreement.5' Alternately, this consultation process can be used to
formulate the U.S. response and to determine whether to accept retalia-
tion from the complaining Member State. 2 Furthermore, this process "is
triggered automatically when a foreign nation requests that the federal
government negotiate to resolve an offending statute."53
45. See URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iii)(I).
46. See id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(ii).
47. See id. § 3512(b)(l)(C)(iii)(I).
48. See id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(ii).
49. See id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iii)(II). The USTR must provide to state representatives all
documents and submissions in connection with Panel or Appellate Body proceedings, and the
opportunity to advise and assist the USTR in preparing any factual information or argumenta-
tion concerning the state measure for use in any written or oral presentations by the United
States in consultations or panel proceedings. Additionally, the USTR will invite the state rep-
resentative to attend Panel or Appellate body proceedings as part of the official U.S.
delegation and, where appropriate, to make presentations to the Panel or Appellate Body on
the state measure concerned. See SAA, H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 673 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,4052.
50. See URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iv).
51. Id. § 3512(b)(1).
52. "The Trade Representative shall establish.., a Federal-State consultation process for
addressing issues relating to the Uruguay Round Agreements that directly relate to, or will
potentially have a direct effect on, the States." Id. § 3512(b)(1)(B).
53. Id. § 3512(b)(1)(C)(i).
[Vol. 22:735
Interpreting URAA Section 102(b)
2. Congressional Oversight
The URAA requires the USTR to report to Congress on the exis-
tence, status, and disposition of complaints by other Member States and
to report the same information concerning USTR lawsuits against States.
Section 123 directs the USTR to notify the relevant Congressional com-
mittees of jurisdiction promptly after the establishment of a Panel to hear
a complaint against federal or state laws 4 The USTR also must inform
these committees of jurisdiction whether and how it plans to implement
an adverse report's recommendations.5 If the USTR plans to do so by
legally challenging the state law, section 102(b)(2)(C) requires the USTR
to report to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee at least 30 days before it files an action against the
state. This report must describe the proposed action, efforts by the USTR
to resolve the matter with the state by other means, and certify that the
USTR has substantially complied with the above described federal-state
consultations mandated by section 102(b)( 1)(C).56
Furthermore, the USTR must annually prepare a report for Congress
that describes the major activities of the WTO, including the status and
disposition of disputes. 7 Every five years" the USTR must give Con-
gress its own independent evaluation of "the effects of the WTO
Agreement on the interests of the United States, the costs and benefits of
U.S. participation in the WTO, and the value of continued participa-
tion."59 The annual report is designed to assure Congress that, among
other things, the WTO "will not intrude on the sovereignty of individual
nations, and remains responsive to the interests of the United States."
6
The five-year review reflects Congress' intent to be an active partner,
with the President, in determining whether the U.S. will continue to par-
ticipate in the WTO.6' Congress may vote on a joint resolution to
54. Id. § 3533.
55. See id.
56. See id. § 3512(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii). See also SAA, H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 675
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4054.
57. See URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3534.
58. See id. § 3535.
59. Id. § 3535(a)(2).
60. H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 34 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3806.
61. See id.
The purpose of this provision is to provide an opportunity for Congress ... to as-
sess periodically whether continued membership in this organization is in the best
interest of the United States. It is the desire of the Committee not to leave this deci-
sion totally in the hands of the Executive Branch but to be active in determining
whether the WTO is an effective organization for achieving common trade goals
and for settling trade disputes among sovereign nations.
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withdraw U.S. approval of the WTO Agreement,62 and thereby to. end
U.S. participation in the WTO, within 90 legislative days of the submis-
sion of the five-year review.63
3. Procedures Governing Legal Challenges
If a negotiated solution cannot be reached, the USTR may bring an
action in federal court for the purpose of having the state law declared
invalid. 64 Section 102(b)(2)(B) provides a variety of procedures govern-
ing the legal challenge that are designed to safeguard state sovereignty.
The two that are relevant to the issue addressed in this Note are in
clauses (i) and (ii).
(B) Procedures governing action
In any action described in subparagraph (A) that is brought by
the United States against a State or any subdivision thereof-
(i) a report of a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body
convened under the Dispute Settlement Understanding re-
garding the State law, or the law of any political subdivision
thereof, shall not be considered as binding or otherwise ac-
corded deference;
(ii) the United States shall have the burden of proving that the
law that is the subject of the action, or the application of that
law, is inconsistent with the agreement in question ....65
Section 102(C) governs the effect WTO Panel and Appellate Body
reports have in U.S. domestic law. It makes clear that legal proceedings
initiated by the USTR are the sole means of challenging state laws under
the WTO Agreement. Private parties are denied both a cause of action
based on state non-compliance with the URAA as well as the use of such
non-compliance as a defense.6 This is true even after the USTR has ob-
61tained a judgment in federal court invalidating the state measure.
62. See URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3535(c).
63. See S. REP. No. 103-412, at 24 (1994).
64. See URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A).
65. Id. § 3512 (b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
66. See id. § 3512(c)(1). "No person, other than the United States, shall have any cause of
action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements or by virtue of congressional
approval of the Uruguay Round Agreements." Id. In addition, Congress stated its intention to
"occupy the field," precluding any person, other than the United States, (Id. § 3512(c)(2))
"[from challenging], in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction
by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any [s]tate, or any
political subdivision of a [s]tate on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with
[the Uruguay Round Agreements]." Id. § 3512(c)(1).
1 67. See SAA, H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 676 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4040,4054.
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Section 102(C) thus closes the federal court doors to aggrieved foreign
corporations or governments.
III. SKIDMORE DEFERENCE
The danger that this Note seeks to address and avert is that the
USTR may usurp the interpretive authority that Congress assigned to the
courts by contending that the preemptive scope of section 102(b)(2)(A)
is ambiguous and that this ambiguity represents an implicit congres-
sional delegation of interpretive authority to the USTR. Where Congress
implicitly delegates interpretive authority to an administrative agency,
courts must give the agency's decisions binding Chevron deference.
However, because section 102(b) reflects Congress' intent to carve
out an exception to the USTR's interpretive authority when state sover-
eignty is at stake, Chevron deference is not the appropriate standard. In
the first section of this Part, I will describe the differing deference stan-
dards elaborated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc.68 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 6 9 the types of agency deci-
sions and rules to which they apply, and the Court's reasons for adopting
these two standards. In the second section, I will show that the statutory
structure of section 102(b) is inconsistent with giving the USTR Chevron
deference. Next, I will describe the Court's standard for reviewing agen-
cies' preemption decisions, and show that these decisions also foreclose
Chevron deference to the USTR in legal proceedings pursuant to section
102(b)(2)(A). Finally, I will present the positive argument for Skidmore
deference.
A. Standards of Review for Agency Rules
1. Legislative vs. Nonlegislative Rules
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines "rule" broadly
enough "to encompass virtually any statement an agency might make in
any context."7° It includes statements "of general or particular applicabil-
ity," which means that a rule can cover generic classes, even if there is
only a single individual in the class, and rulemaking addressed to named
68. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
69. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
70. 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 6.1, at 226 (3d. ed. 1994). See also Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1996) defining "rule" as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency...." Id.
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persons.7 ' Therefore, the USTR's interpretation of section 102(b) may be
treated as a rule.
According to Davis & Pierce, a rule may be either legislative or in-
terpretive.72 There are four distinctions between legislative and
interpretive rules, though only two of them are relevant here. First, legis-
lative rules have the same binding effect as a statute on the public, the
agency, and the courts, while interpretive rules have only persuasive au-
thority.73 For this reason, courts must give legislative rules Chevron
deference, while interpretive rules receive only Skidmore deference.
74
Second, an agency may only issue legislative rules if Congress has spe-
cifically authorized it to, while an agency has the inherent authority to
issue interpretive rules.75
2. Chevron Deference for Legislative Rules
In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,6 the
Supreme Court established the standard of review it would apply to agen-
cies' constructions of the statutes they administer.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.77
In order for a court to find that Congress has "directly spoken" to an
issue in step one, it is not necessary to show that Congress had a specific
intent with respect to this issue or that the statutory text directly addresses
71. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 6.2, at 226.
72. The term "interpretive rule" can be misleading, because legislative rules are often in-
terpretations of statutory language. The distinction between the two, which will be developed
in greater detail in the discussion of Chevron deference, concerns the agency's authority to
promulgate binding interpretations of the statute.
73. See DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 6.3, at 233-34.
74. See infra Parts III.A.2 and 3.
75. See DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 6.3, at 234.
76. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
77. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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the particular question at hand.78 For this reason, if a court determines that
the agency's construction conflicts with a more general or abstract statu-
tory purpose, it may reject the agency construction in step one, even if
there is no contrary specific intent in the statute's text or legislative his-
tory.
79
Because the preemptive scope of section 102(b)(2)(A) is arguably
ambiguous, the USTR could argue that this ambiguity represents an im-
plicit delegation of interpretive authority, thereby limiting the court to
reasonableness review. In order to do so, however, the USTR must first
demonstrate that Congress delegated it the legislative rulemaking authority
to interpret the URAA, because Chevron deference applies only to legisla-
tive rules.
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 80
Thus, stage two has two elements: First, has Congress delegated legis-
lative authority to the agency? Second, is the agency's interpretation
reasonable?8' Though Congress expressly delegated to the USTR the au-
thority to issue legislative regulations pursuant to section 141 of the Trade
Act of 1974, in the following section I will argue that the statutory scheme
embodied in section 102(b) clearly expresses a specific, contrary intent
that the USTR's litigating position against a state in legal proceedings pur-
suant to section 102(b)(2)(A) should not be given binding deference, and
that section 102(b) overrides section 141's more general grant of authority.
Certain passages of Chevron suggest that where Congress has not ex-
pressly delegated interpretive authority to an agency, ambiguity or silence
ipso facto delegates interpretive authority.82 But such an interpretation is
inconsistent with the Court's rationale for deference to agency interpreta-
tions, expertise and political accountability,83 as well as with subsequent
78. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); Bd. of Governors, Fed. Re-
serve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
79. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 24 (1990). If the Court were to hold otherwise, Congress' only
means of limiting agency discretion would be to list off every conceivable situation covered by
the statute and to prescribe in detail what the agency is to do under each set of circumstances.
80. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (emphasis added).
81. See Anthony, supra note 79, at 31.
82. See id. at 32-3. See also Chevron, 467 U.S at 865. "For judicial purposes, it matters
not" whether Congress "consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this
level" or if Congress "simply did not consider the question at this level."
83. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
Summer 20011
Michigan Journal of International Law
cases. When the reviewing court finds that there is a gap in stage one, def-
erence to the agency is not based on its superior expertise in interpreting
congressional intent, because there is none to interpret. "The agency is not
clarifying Congress' decision, it is making the decision itself."" Con-
versely, Chevron deference is not appropriate where Congress has
expressed an intent, but has done so ambiguously,8 as it did in section
102(b)(2)(A). In the third section of this Part, I will show that when the
interpretive issue is the scope of an agency's delegated authority to pre-
empt state laws, the Court has not applied the Chevron analysis to agency
constructions, even if the scope of delegated authority is arguably ambigu-
ous, but instead has independently interpreted the statute.
3. Skidmore Deference for Interpretive Rules
The issue in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.86 was the weight to be given to
the administrator's interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938. The Act explicitly denied the Administrator the power to issue leg-
islative rules, but in order to perform his assigned task of enforcement,
the Administrator had to determine the meaning of the Act's provisions.
The Court announced the following standard of review for such interpre-
tive rules and regulations:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi-
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
Judges... are not part of either political branch of the Government .... In contrast,
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administra-
tion's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for
this political branch of Government to make such policy choices ....
Id.
84. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. OF Am. U. 187, 196-97 (1992). "Chevron assumes that Con-
gress does not know exactly what it wants but trusts the agency .... The agency is in a
particularly good position to determine not what rule Congress prescribed but which rule is
best." Id. at 194-96.
85. See Chevron, 867 U.S. at 843 n.9. "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent." See also Herz, supra note 84, at 199.
86. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
[Vol. 22:735
Interpreting URAA Section 102(b)
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.87
The Court has affirmed the principle that interpretive rules deserve a
lower degree of deference than legislative rules in subsequent cases.88 Fur-
thermore, in elaborating the Skidmore standard, the Court has given
weight to a number of other factors that strengthen an agency's claim to
persuasive authority:89 whether the agency helped draft the statute;' the
agency's technical expertise and familiarity with the statute;9' whether the
agency's construction of the statute is contemporaneous with enactment92
or longstanding and consistent; or whether Congress has reenacted or
amended the statute and left the relevant portion unchanged.94 The first two
of the above factors, that the USTR helped draft the URAA and that it has
expertise and familiarity with it, would be present in any legal proceeding
pursuant to section 102(b)(2)(A). Whether the other factors work in the
USTR's favor would depend on the particular facts of the dispute and the
prior positions the USTR had taken on the issue.
Unlike Chevron deference, which is based on a delegation of legisla-
tive authority, "Skidmore deference is based solely on common sense."95
An agency has often carefully considered potential alternative resolutions
and how they relate to the statutory language, purpose, and legislative his-
tory, as well as its own capabilities and resources available for
implementing the statute.96 When a court affirms an interpretive rule, the
87. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
88. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Court held that because
Congress did not grant the EEOC legislative rulemaking power, the ruling of the EEOC was
an interpretive rule and applied Skidmore deference. Id. at 140-43. The Court then rejected the
EEOC's decision because it was neither contemporaneous, nor consistent over time, conflict-
ing with earlier pronouncements. See also EEOC v. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (giving
Skidmore deference to an EEOC interpretive rule, and rejecting it for the same reasons as it
had in Gilbert).
89. See Herz, supra note 84, at 194-97. The following list of factors and supporting cases
is taken from Herz's article.
90. See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144 (1979) ("Administrative interpretations are
especially persuasive where, as here, the agency participated in developing the provision.").
91. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
92. See Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 120
(1980); Fulman v. U.S., 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978).
93. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981)
("[C]onstruction deserves special deference when it has remained consistent over a long period
of time."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) ("[L]ongstanding and
consistent administrative interpretation is entitled to considerable weight.").
94. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-01 (1981); Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 350 U.S. 46, 53 (1955).
95. DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 6.3, at 242.
96. See id. at 243. See also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40. ("[T]he Administrator's policies
are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader
investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case. They do
Summer 20011]
Michigan Journal of International Law
source of authority is either Congress or the court, but never the agency. It
is Congress if the court determines that there is only one permissible con-
struction of the provision in question.97 It is the court if there are multiple
possible constructions. In that case the court determines which interpreta-
tion is best, even if the court ultimately agrees with the agency's
construction. 8
B. The USTR's Interpretation Does not
Deserve Chevron Deference
Section 102(b) mandates a variety of procedures in the event that a
WTO Panel or Appellate Body finds that a state law conflicts with the
WTO Agreement. Rather than stipulating that such state laws are auto-
matically preempted upon such a finding, or even that, after independent
review, the USTR may preempt them at its discretion, section 102(b) re-
quires the USTR to first initiate consultations with the affected state
government(s). If, and only if, the USTR and the state(s) cannot find a
"mutually agreeable response," then the USTR may bring an action
against the state(s) for the purpose of having the state law declared invalid.
In such a proceeding, the statute directs the court to make its decision in-
dependent of both the WTO Panel or Appellate Body report and the
USTR, which is inconsistent with giving the USTR Chevron deference.
But before turning to these arguments, I will outline the statutory duties
and powers of the USTR, which would, under other circumstances, justify
Chevron deference to its interpretation of statutes touching upon interna-
tional trade policy. I will end this section with a discussion of Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital,99 which provides an independent ration-
ale for refusing to give the USTR's litigating position Chevron deference.
1. Scope of USTR Duties and Powers
Section 141 of the Trade Act of 1974 defines the duties and powers of
the Office of the United States Trade Representative. The USTR and the
three Deputy United States Trade Representatives are political appointees,
determine the policy which will guide applications for enforcement by injunction on behalf of the
Government.").
97. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
98. See id. See also Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Defer-
ence to Agency Interpretations after EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 186 (1992). 'The
critical distinction between Chevron and Skidmore is that when applying the Skidmore deference
principle, a court is always free to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency."
99. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
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who serve at the pleasure of the President.'0 The duties of the USTR in-
clude the following:
(1) The United States Trade Representative shall-
(A) have primary responsibility for developing, and coordi-
nating the implementation of, United States international
trade policy...
(B) serve as the principal advisor to the President on interna-
tional trade policy•...
(C) have lead responsibility for the conduct of, and shall be
the chief representative of the United States for, interna-
tional trade negotiations, including all negotiations on any
matter considered under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization...
(D) issue and coordinate policy guidance to departments and
agencies on basic issues of policy and interpretation aris-
ing in the exercise of international trade functions,
including any matter considered under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization, to the extent necessary to as-
sure coordination of international trade policy and
consistent with any other law;
(E) act as the principal spokesman of the President on inter-
national trade;
(F) report directly to the President and Congress regarding,
and be responsible to the President and the Congress for
the administration of trade agreements programs ....'01
Furthermore, the USTR has the power to "promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the functions, powers and
duties vested in him."'' 2 Where Congress has delegated an agency such
broad regulatory authority, courts give Chevron deference to legislative
rules promulgated by the agency. 03
100. Trade Act of 1974 § 141, 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b) (1999 & Supp. I 2001) [hereinafter
Trade Act].
101. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(A)-(F) (emphasis added).
102. Id. § 2171(e)(3).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999) (U.S. Customs
Service regulations interpreting the Harmonized Tariff Schedule entitled to Chevron deference);
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (De-
partment of Commerce interpretation of Tariff Act receives Chevron deference). The Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied the Chevron standard to issues
involving international trade in the same way that courts apply it generally, and did not mention
that the international trade context requires any modification to the normal Chevron analysis.
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2. Judicial Independence and the Statement
of Administrative Action'O'
Though these provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 may give the USTR
the authority to issue legislative regulations, to which Chevron deference
is due in other circumstances, the text and structure of section 102(b)
represent a clear congressional intent that courts should not give the USTR
Chevron deference in legal proceedings pursuant to section 102(b)(2)(A).
The text of sections 102(b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), along with their legislative
history, make it clear that the findings of neither the WTO Panel or
Appellate Body nor the USTR are binding on the reviewing court.
(B) Procedures governing action
In any action described in subparagraph (A) that is brought by
the United States against a State or any subdivision thereof-
(i) a report of a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate
Body convened under the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing regarding the State law, or the law of any
political subdivision thereof, shall not be considered as
binding or otherwise accorded deference;
(ii) the United States shall have the burden of proving that the
law that is the subject of the action, or the application of
that law, is inconsistent with the agreement in question
105
104. In what follows, I rely heavily on the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) sub-
mitted by the President to Congress prior to congressional approval of the URAA. The SAA is an
authoritative source for interpretation and application of the URAA.
Pursuant to section 2903 of this title and section 2191 of this title, the Congress ap-
proves-
(1) the trade agreements described in subsection (d) of this section resulting from the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, entered into on April 15, 1994, and submitted to the
Congress on September 27, 1994; and
(2) the statement of administrative action proposed to implement the agreement that
was submitted to the Congress on September 27, 1994.
URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (a).
The statement of administrative action approved by the Congress under section
351 ](a) of this title shall be regarded as an authoritative expression by the United
States concerning the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments and this Act in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning
such interpretation or application.
Id. at § 3512(d).
105. Id. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
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It could be argued that the statute only denies deference or binding
effect to WTO Panel or Appellate Body findings, but not the USTR. Ac-
cording to this argument, placing the burden of proof on the USTR is
consistent with giving it Chevron deference. In such cases, carrying the
burden would consist of the USTR showing that its construction is a
"permissible construction of the statute," i.e., that is not "arbitrary, capri-
cious or manifestly contrary :to the statute." But the Statement of
Administrative Action (SAA) for the URAA contradicts this assertion.
The SAA directs the court to consider the issue "de novo."'
16
The United States would base any such proceeding on the provi-
sions of the relevant Uruguay Round agreement-not a panel
report-and the court would thus consider the matter de novo
.... In any such proceeding, the United States would have the
burden of proof and the court would reach its own, independent
interpretation of the relevant provisions in the light of the
agreement's negotiating and legislative history, including this
Statement.
10 7
Where Chevron deference is appropriate, "the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute."' °8 Here, by contrast, the leg-
islative history commands courts to do just that. Furthermore, the SAA
sharply limits the discretion and authority of the USTR to authoritatively
interpret the various provisions of the URAA. Section 102(d) provides
that:
The statement of administrative action approved by the Congress
under section 3511(a) of this title shall be regarded as an au-
thoritative expression by the United States concerning the
interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments and this Act in any judicial proceeding in which a
question arises concerning such interpretation or application.'O,
This statutory provision, read together with the above portion of the
legislative history, indicates a clear congressional intent not to delegate
the interpretive authority to the USTR when the issue is whether state
laws conflict with the URAA. By adopting the SAA at the same time as
it enacted the URAA, Congress made clear that the SAA is the last word
on congressional intent for any of the matters it covers. Whatever
106. SAA, H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 675 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,
4054.
107. Id. (second emphasis added).
108. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
109. URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (emphasis added). See also SAA, H.R. REP. No. 103-
826(I), at 656 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040.
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ambiguities regarding deference or preemptive scope there may be in
section 102(b)(2)(A) or (B) are resolved by the accompanying legislative
history. But even if these provisions were ambiguous, section 102(d)
makes clear that the text of the statute itself and the SAA are the primary
sources of interpretive authority.
In determining how to deal with conflicts between state law and the
WTO Agreement, Congress had several options open to it and various
legislative means of accomplishing its purpose. It could have provided
that in such cases the state law is automatically preempted, but Congress
expressly declined to do so. If its purpose was solely to protect U.S. sov-
ereignty, it could have provided that the USTR could preempt the state
law at its own discretion, and courts would have to give such decisions
Chevron deference. But again, Congress refused to do so. Instead, it
chose to acknowledge the importance of not only national sovereignty,
but of state sovereignty as well. Rather than let the USTR be the judge in
its own cause, Congress decided that the USTR would have to challenge
the State law in federal court and to convince an independent tribunal
that the state law in question conflicts with the URAA. To give the
USTR Chevron deference would turn both of these provisions from sec-
tion 102(b)(2)(B) on their head. It would shift decision-making authority
from the judiciary to the USTR, and it would do more than merely shift
the burden of proof from the USTR to the State, but rather give the
USTR a presumption of validity, as courts would have to accept the
USTR's interpretations unless they were "arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute.""'
Before moving on to discuss the consultation provisions, I must ad-
dress a case that seems to contradict the above argument. The Court held
in United States v. Haggar Apparel Co."' that: "[d]eference can be given
to the regulations without impairing the authority of the court to make
factual determinations, and to apply those determinations to the law, de
novo."' 2 Therefore, Chevron deference is not inconsistent with de novo
review or with the court's obligation to reach a correct decision.
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
111. 526 U.S. 380 (1999). The challenged regulation in this case was a legislative regula-
tion promulgated by the U.S. Customs Service after notice and comment procedures. The
regulation interpreted a provision of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule that gave an exemption
from duties where the product was assembled abroad but all of the component parts were manu-
factured in the United States and had "not been advanced in value or approved in condition
abroad." Id. at 385-86.
112. Id. at 391. The governing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2643, provided that if the Court of In-
ternational Trade was "unable to reach the correct decision" in the first trial, it could order a
retrial or rehearing or any other administrative or adjudicative procedures "necessary to reach
the correct decision." 28 U.S.C. § 2643. Haggar Apparel contended that in this retrial the
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While it is true that, as a general principle, Chevron deference is not
inconsistent with de novo review, Chevron deference is inconsistent with
the procedures governing legal challenges contained in section
102(b)(2)(B). First of all, the Court justified its decision in Haggar Ap-
parel on the ground that Congress had not expressed its intent to deviate
from the "usual rule that the regulations of an administering agency war-
rant judicial deference."" 3 For the reasons discussed above, section
102(b), along with the relevant provisions of the SAA, is a clear state-
ment by Congress of its intent to deviate from the 'usual rule' in matters
relating to the legal challenges of state laws. Second, the regulations in
Haggar Apparel were legislative regulations adopted pursuant to notice-
and-comment procedures. The Court in Haggar Apparel emphasized that
"[d]e novo proceedings presume a foundation of law. The question here
is whether the regulations are part of that controlling law."" 4 As will be
demonstrated in the following section, the USTR's litigating position
should not be treated as a legislative regulation, and therefore not as a
part of the controlling law."'
3. The Consultation Provisions and Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital
Although the USTR has the power to issue legislative regulations,
the time at which it does so affects the weight courts are to give to them.
Specifically, if the USTR had not promulgated such regulations prior to a
WTO Panel report finding that a state law conflicts with the WTO
Agreement, the USTR's position would not be entitled to Chevron defer-
ence in subsequent litigation. To do so would be inconsistent with the
provisions governing federal-state consultations and with the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital."
6
In the event of an adverse panel or Appellate Body report, section
102(b)(1)(C)(iv) requires the USTR not only to initiate consultations
with state governments,"' but it also directs the USTR to seek a
Court of International Trade must consider the issue de novo, which in and of itself precluded
giving Customs Service regulations Chevron deference. Haggar Apparel, 526 U.S. at 390-91.
113. Haggar Apparel, 526 U.S. at 390-91 (alteration added).
114. Id.
115. If there were already legislative rules in place governing the subject matter that the
challenged state law sought to regulate or legislative rules that preempted the state law, the
Court's analysis would apply. But in cases where the USTR or other federal regulations gov-
erned, the state law would have already been preempted and there would be no complaint to
the WTO in the first place. There is also the possibility that the state and federal regulation
could be in conflict and coexist, perhaps because the issue of whether there was a conflict that
had not been litigated. In such cases, the first finding of a conflict would be by a WTO Panel
and the Supreme Court's approach in Haggar Apparel may apply.
116. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
117. See infra Part II.C.1.
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"mutually agreeable response" to the report. ' If the USTR were to
characterize its litigating position as a legislative rule, its position could
not be given Chevron deference, because this unilateral action cannot be
a "mutually agreeable response."'' 9 In enacting section 102(b), Congress
required the federal government to bargain with state governments to
achieve a cooperative solution. If the USTR were able to promulgate
legislative regulations in the middle of this bargaining process, the
USTR would effectively have the power to veto state law, so long as the
regulation was not clearly inconsistent with the statute. This would upset
the federal-state balance established by section 102(b) and violate the
clear terms of the statute and thereby Chevron's step two.
Apart from the inconsistency with the particular provisions of the
URAA, there is a more general rule according to which courts do not
give Chevron deference to agency litigating positions. In Bowen,'2° the
Court held that it would not defer to a Department of Health and Human
Services' (HHS) litigating position that was "wholly unsupported by
regulations, rulings, or administrative practice."'2 ' In Bowen, the Court
was interpreting the Medicare Act, which gives the HHS express author-
ity to promulgate regulations governing Medicare reimbursement to
health care providers. HHS contended that regulations pursuant to this
broad grant of rulemaking authority are due Chevron deference. The
Court held that under the circumstances, i.e., where the evidence indi-
cated that the HHS adopted its position for the purpose of litigation,
Chevron deference was not appropriate.
118. URAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(l)(C)(iv).
If a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds that the law of a State is
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the Trade Representative
shall consult with the State concerned in an effort to develop a mutually agreeable
response to the report of the panel or the Appellate Body and shall make every ef-
fort to ensure that the State concerned is involved in the development of the United
States position regarding the response.
Id.
119. This is not to say that the state may not voluntarily comply, in which case, no legal
proceedings would be instituted in the first place. On the other hand, assuming that Congress
had delegated interpretive authority to the USTR, if the legislative rule preempting the particu-
lar state law entered into force prior to the complaint or establishment of the panel, there
would be nothing for other Member States to complain about.
120. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
121. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212. The primary issue in this case was whether grants of legis-
lative authority to agencies include the power to make retroactive rules. The dispute in Bowen
concerned a rule that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had promulgated in 1981
without the required notice and comment procedures and which had been struck down for that
reason. The Secretary then followed the proper procedures and reenacted the rule again in
1984 with the same 1981 effective date.
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[W]e have declined to give deference to an agency's counsel's
interpretation of a statute where the agency itself has articulated
no position on the question, on the ground that 'Congress has
delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate
counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory
commands.'
Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's
convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.'22
The relevance of this case to future disputes involving state laws
would depend on whether or not the USTR had taken a position on the
issue in question prior to the adverse Panel or Appellate Body Report.
Bowen makes clear that if the USTR had taken no position or a contrary
position prior to the litigation, courts will not give Chevron deference to
its subsequent litigating positions. 3 On the other hand, if the USTR's
position were consistent with long-standing practice, contemporaneous
with enactment, or if Congress had reenacted or amended the statute
without changing this provision, its position would be strengthened-not
because it is entitled to Chevron deference, but rather because these are
the same factors that strengthen an agency's persuasive authority under
Skidmore. 1
24
The Supreme Court has subsequently elaborated on the principle
announced in Bowen. In Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,' the Court held that
it need not give Chevron deference to the Secretary of Labor's
interpretation of the Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA),
because "Congress has expressly established the Judiciary and not the
Department of Labor as the adjudicator of private rights of action arising
122. Id. at 212-13. The quoted passage adopts a principle somewhat broader than re-
quired to decide the case. The Court placed great weight on the fact that HHS had argued in
past litigation for a contrary interpretation of the statutory provision in question, and thus was
not dealing with a situation where HHS had taken no position at all on the issue. See id.
123. An open question is whether the beginning of litigation will be determined from the
filing of the complaint at the WTO, once consultations begin, or once the USTR files in fed-
eral court. The first option seems unrealistic, because it would remove from the USTR the
discretion to independently arrive at a position contrary to the State's, even if this is what the
law, treaty, or administration policy requires.
124. See infra Part III.A.3. Another open question is whether it would be possible for
there to be legislative regulations already issued. Section 2171 does not deprive the USTR of
authority to make legislative rules concerning section 102(b). I would argue that any such
rules that are contrary to the interpretation I laid out in Part III.B supra, are contrary to the
statute and fail Chevron step one. Therefore, no such rules would exist prior to the beginning
of the litigation, after which beginning they would automatically lose their legislative charac-
ter due to Bowen.
125. 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
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under the statute."'' 26 The scheme established by the URAA clearly
differs in important respects-it does not give rise to private causes of
action-but the statute clearly provides that the Judiciary, rather than the
USTR, is to adjudicate conflicts between state and federal law.
Therefore, if the USTR were to argue that its interpretation of section
102(b) is entitled to Chevron deference, it would be attempting to
"regulate the scope of the judicial power vested by the statute,"'27 and
thereby run afoul of the Court's holding in Adams Fruit.
C. Chevron Deference Does not Apply• 28
to Agency Preemption
In addition to the above structural arguments specific to the URAA,
there is a more general principle of administrative law that agency inter-
pretations of the scope of their own, delegated authority do not merit
Chevron deference from courts. The Court's leading agency preemption
cases do not even mention Chevron when interpreting the scope of con-
gressionally delegated authority. Instead, the Court has performed its
own independent analysis of the statutory language to determine whether
the agency was authorized to preempt the state law in question. Thus,
even though section 141 of the Trade Act of 1974 delegates to the USTR
the authority to issue legislative regulations, its interpretation of the
scope of that rulemaking authority is not owed any deference.
The Court announced the standard for review of agency decisions to
preempt state law in a pre-Chevron case, United States v. Shimer. 29 At
issue in Shimer was the scope of authority delegated to the Veterans'
126. Id. at 649. The Court in Adams Fruit refused to defer to the Secretary of Labor's in-
terpretation of the scope of the statutory provision providing a private cause of action. The
Court acknowledged that Congress delegated to the Department of Labor the authority to
promulgate regulations, but held that "[t]his delegation, however, does not empower the Secre-
tary to regulate the scope of the judicial power vested by the statute." Id. at 650. See also
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). In Crandon, Justice Scalia argued in a concur-
ring opinion that administrative interpretations were not entitled to Chevron deference because
"[t]he law in question ... is not administered by any agency but by the courts." Id. at 177.
127. Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 650.
128. This Note is concerned with statutory preemption, specifically, the preemptive ef-
fect of URAA § 102(b)(2)(A), rather than "administrative preemption," which concerns the
preemptive effect of agency regulations. I will not address the preemptive effect of legislative
regulations that the USTR may issue, but, for the reasons presented in sections B.2 and B.3
above, the USTR is not empowered to issue legislative regulations interpreting the preemptive
scope of section 102(b). See Howard P. Walthall, Jr., Chevron v. Federalism: A Reassement
[sic] of Deference to Administrative Preemption, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 727 (1998). Walthall
argues that there are two types of administrative preemption. "First, the regulation may deter-
mine the interpretation of a federal statute which in turn preempts state law. Second, the
regulation may itself preempt state law." Id. at 715 n. I. If the USTR were empowered to
promulgate such regulations, which I argue that they are not, they would be of the first sort.
129. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
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Administration. The clause that authorized the Veterans' Administration
to promulgate regulations that preempt state laws is nearly identical to
the clause authorizing the USTR to do so."30 The Court held that where
Congress has delegated such broad discreticin, the Court should defer to
agency interpretations when the
decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the
force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended
upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters
subjected to agency regulations .... If this choice represents a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not
disturb it unless it appears from the statute or the legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would
have sanctioned. 3'
Thus, there are two preconditions for deference to agency preemp-
tion decisions. First, interpretation of the statute must involve reconciling
conflicting policies, policies for which special expertise is necessary to
understand. Second, this accommodation must be one that Congress
would have sanctioned. In the remainder of this section, I will show that
neither of these preconditions is satisfied with regard to a construction
giving the USTR Chevron deference. In the following section, however, I
will argue that both of these rationales are consistent with Skidmore def-
erence.
Post-Chevron agency preemption cases have elaborated on the
Shimer standard, without applying the Chevron test to agency
interpretations of the scope of their delegated authority.'3 2 The Court's
130. See Shimer, 367 U.S. at 382 n.9 ("Section 504 of the Act provides: 'The Adminis-
trator is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this title, as
amended, as are necessary and appropriate for carrying out the provisions of this title...'").
131. Id. at 382-83. The Supreme Court has reiterated this rationale in numerous cases,
quoting the last sentence of the above quotation. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700
(1984); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988).
132. The fact that the Court has not mentioned Chevron is all the more striking because
Chevron cites the exact same cases in support of agency deference as Shimer does. Compare
Shimer, 367 U.S. at 382 with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45. Some commentators have argued
that cases like Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), and Hillsborough v. Automated Med.
Lab., 471 U.S. 707 (1985), stand for the proposition that the Court gives Chevron deference to
agencies when their interpretations limit the preemptive scope of the statutes they are charged
with enforcing, but not when they interpret their authority broadly. See Walthall, supra note
128, at 758-62; Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59
U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 841 (1998). In Medtrnic, the Court relied on the FDA's refusal to pre-
empt the state laws in question to conclude that the state law claims in question were not
preempted. The Hillsborugh Court similarly refused to find state regulations preempted
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approach is illustrated by City of New York v. FCC133 and Louisiana
Public Service Commission v. FCC.14 In both cases, the FCC, pursuant
to a broad delegation of interpretive authority, 35 had preempted state
laws. The Court applied a two step analysis to determine the preemptive
effect of such regulations, without even mentioning Chevron. The first
step is to determine whether the agency intends the regulation to preempt
state law, and the second is "whether that action is within the scope of
the [agency's] delegated authority.' ' 36 If these conditions are met,
"[flederal regulations, if consistent with the governing statute, will
preempt any state or local law that either conflicts with those regulations
or frustrates their purpose.'
37
It is the second step of this analysis that is relevant to the issue at
hand. The focus in the second inquiry is not on whether or not Congress
intended to preempt state law, 38 but whether or not the regulation is con-
sistent with delegated authority. 3 1 In Louisiana Public Service
Commission v. FCC, the Court did not give Chevron deference to the
FCC's interpretation of its authority to preempt state laws. Instead, it
conducted its own independent analysis of the scope of authority dele-
gated by the statute,' 4° refusing to defer to the FCC's reasonable
where the FDA did not intend for its regulations to have preemptive effect. However, both of
these cases are more consistent with the above two-stage Shimer/de la Cuesta analysis. The
agencies' interpretations that the statute they were charged with enforcing did not preempt the
challenged state laws served as evidence that the agency did not intend to preempt, i.e., the
analysis stopped at stage one and did not proceed to stage two. Therefore, these cases have
nothing to say about deference to agency interpretations as to the scope of their delegated
authority.
133.' 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
134. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
135. See City of New York, 486 U.S. at 66-7. The statute stated that Congress had dele-
gated to the FCC the authority to "[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter... 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(r)." Id.
136. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 154.
137. See American Bar Association, The Law of Preemption: A Report of the Appellate
Judges Conference 27 (Kenneth Starr, et. al) (1991).
138. See City of New York, 486 U.S. at 64 ("[A] 'narrow focus on Congress' intent to su-
persede state law [is] misdirected,' for '[a] pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on
express congressional authorization to displace state law.' ").
139. See Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 374 ("[A] federal agency may
pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally dele-
gated authority. This is true for at least two reasons. First, an agency literally has no power to
act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until
Congress confers power upon it. Second, the best way of determining whether Congress in-
tended the regulations of an administrative agency to displace state law is to examine the
nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency.").
140. See Walthall, supra note 128, at 734-40.
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interpretation, even though it admitted that the statute was ambiguous.'4'
Despite the FCC's policy expertise, the Court found that deference to it
as to the scope of its own authority would allow the agency to override
Congress' intent to limit the FCC's power. 42 Similarly, in City of New
York, the Court independently interpreted the FCC's statutory author-
ity.' 3 Although the Court upheld the FCC regulations preempting state
law, the Court did not suggest that it should defer to the agency, or even
mention what the agency thought the scope of its. statutory authority
was.'" The Court noted that deference to agency determinations of their
own authority is only appropriate where the decision "involve[s] a broad
grant of authority to reconcile conflicting policies."'
14
1
Just as in Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, Congress expressed its
intent to limit the USTR's authority to preempt state laws in section
102(b). The USTR cannot contend that courts should defer to its con-
struction of this provision, because it satisfies neither of the
preconditions set forth in Shimer. Though Congress clearly has dele-
gated to the USTR broad authority to reconcile conflicting international
trade policies, it did not do so with respect to the policies underlying
section 102(b). Congress expressed two clear policies in section 102(b),
both of which are designed to protect state laws and to promote state
sovereignty. First, Congress commanded the USTR to makes its best
efforts to develop a "mutually agreeable response" to adverse WTO
panel or Appellate Body reports. Preemption is a "last resort," available
141. See Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 379 ("Like many statutes, the
Act contains some internal inconsistencies, vague language, and areas of uncertainty. It is not
a perfect puzzle into which all the pieces fit. Thus, it is with the recognition that there are not
crisp answers to all of the contentions of either party that we conclude that § 152(b) represents
a bar to federal pre-emption of state regulation ... "). See also Lawrence County v. Lead-
Deadwood School Dist. No. 40-1,469 U.S. 256 (1985) (applying its own independent analysis
of the preemptive scope of the statute, the Court concluded that the agency was acting within
delegated discretion).
142. See Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 374 ("An agency may not con-
fer power upon itself. To permit an agency to expand its power in the face of a congressional
limitation on its jurisdiction would be to grant to the agency power to override Congress. This
we are both unwilling and unable to do.").
143. See City of New York, 486 U.S. at 69-70. In upholding the FCC regulation, the
Court relied on Congress' awareness of the FCC practice of preempting the field for certain
aspects of cable television regulation when it enacted 1984 Cable Act as well as passages from
the legislative history stating that Congress did not intend to change the balance of power
between federal and local authorities in that field in concluding that the FCC's action was not
contrary to congressional intent. "In sum, we find nothing in the Cable Act which leads us to
believe that the Commission's decision to pre-empt local technical standards . .. 'is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned.'" Id. at 69 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S.
374, 383 (1961)).
144. See Garrelts v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 943 E Supp. 1023, 1043 (Iowa 1996).
145. City of New York, 486 U.S. at 64 (quoting Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383).
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only after all efforts to find a cooperative solution have failed.' 46 Second,
Congress commanded courts to reach their own, independent interpreta-
tion of the URAA and required the USTR to carry the burden of proving
that the state law conflicts with the URAA. With regard to Shimer's sec-
ond precondition, Congress would not have sanctioned giving the USTR
Chevron deference. Congress entrusted the courts, rather than the USTR,
to reconcile the policy of respecting state sovereignty with the policy of
complying with the United States' international obligations.
D. Skidmore Deference is the Appropriate Standard
Section 102(b) commands courts to interpret the relevant provisions
independent of both the USTR and WTO Panel or Appellate Body re-
ports. Its provisions could be consistent with either Skidmore deference
or with a non-deferential standard, but in the context of international
trade, the USTR's policy expertise and statutorily designated policy-
making authority favor the Skidmore standard.
While Chevron deference gives administrative agencies all, or almost
all, the interpretive authority and a non-deferential standard leaves it all
to the courts, Skidmore deference splits interpretive authority between
them. The Skidmore standard is the best reconciliation of the statutory
commandment of judicial independence with the Judiciary's limited in-
stitutional competence, which is discussed below. Thus it is no
coincidence that several of the factors mentioned by the Supreme Court
as supporting Skidmore deference would be present in a USTR legal
challenge: (i) the USTR has greater policy expertise than courts in this
area, (ii) it has greater familiarity with the statutory scheme and pur-
poses, (iii) it participated in negotiating the WTO Agreement and
drafting the URAA and the accompanying SAA, and (iv) it is charged
with implementing and enforcing the URAA.
Though the Supreme Court's cases interpreting international agree-
ments do not explicitly discuss Skidmore or Chevron deference, they
support my contention in holding that the Executive branch is institu-
tionally more competent than the Judiciary to interpret treaties. This
division of labor in construing treaties is based on both the respective
institutional competences of the Executive vis-A-vis the Judiciary, as well
as on our constitutional structure, which delegates to the Executive re-
sponsibility for foreign affairs. In United States v. Lui-Kin Hong, 47 the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained why "the executive
branch's construction of a treaty, although not binding on the courts, is
146. See H.R. REP. No. 103-826(I), at 26 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773,
3798.
147. Lui-Kin Hong, 110 E3d 103, 110 (lst Cir. 1997).
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entitled to great weight."'' 48 In Lui-Kin Hong, the Secretary of State had
decided to extradite a citizen of the People's Republic of China pursuant
to his statutorily authorized discretion. The court explained that inter-
preting international treaties requires a division of labor between the
Executive and Judiciary, according to which each branch takes responsi-
bility for those issues most suited to its particular area of competence.'
4 9
Lui-Kin Hong involved an extradition treaty, which is a somewhat unique
context, but the Supreme Court has in other contexts affirmed the princi-
ple that Executive Branch interpretations have persuasive, but not
binding authority on courts,'5 ° as do those of administrative agencies
charged with negotiating and enforcing the treaty. "' This deference ap-
plies to implementing legislation, as well as to treaties.'
Therefore, though section 102(b) is clearly inconsistent with Chev-
ron deference and commands courts to reach their own, independent
interpretation, precedents interpreting international agreements make it
clear that courts must give some level of deference to the USTR's policy
judgments due to their limited institutional competence. Furthermore,
though Congress limited the scope of the USTR's discretion, it did not
take away its authority for interpreting, coordinating, and implementing
international trade policy.
148. Id. at 110.
149. Id.
This bifurcated procedure reflects the fact that extradition proceedings contain legal
issues peculiarly suited for judicial resolution, such as questions of the standard of
proof, competence or evidence, and treaty construction, yet simultaneously impli-
cate questions of foreign policy, which are better answered by the executive branch.
Both institutional competence rationales and our constitutional structure, which
places primary responsibility for foreign affairs in the executive branch, support this
division of labor.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) ("Re-
spect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning
of an international treaty."(emphasis added)).
151. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret treaties
for themselves, the meaning given them by departments of government particularly charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed
to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforce-
ment is entitled to great weight.").
152. See Mayaguezanos Por La Salud y El Ambiente v. United States, 1999 WL 1191443
at *6 (1st Cir. (Puerto Rico) 1999) (citing the cases above in support of Executive branch in-
terpretation of the implementing legislation for the EURATOM Agreement, the Atomic
Energy Act).
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IV. URAA § 102(b)(2) OBSTACLE PREEMPTION
There are three possible scopes of federal preemption of state laws-
conflict, obstacle, and field preemption. In this Part, I will argue that the
obstacle preemption standard is most consistent with the purposes of the
URAA, Supreme Court precedents, and the USTR's policy expertise and
statutorily delegated policy-making discretion.
First, I will describe the two sets of classifications used in preemp-
tion analysis: (i) classification in terms of preemptive scope-actual
conflict, obstacle, and field preemption-and (ii) classification in terms
of Congressional intent--explicit or implicit. Second, I will show that
obstacle preemption is the standard that is most consistent with the pur-
poses of the URAA. If courts were only to preempt state laws that
actually conflict with the URAA, states would be able to tax and other-
wise financially burden international trade, to prohibit activities that the
URAA and WTO Agreement permit, and to permit activities that they
prohibit. On the other hand, if courts were to infer that Congress in-
tended to occupy all of the fields covered by the URAA, they would do
so contrary to Congress' clear intent, and would create a regulatory vac-
uum over wide swathes of the economy. Because in preemption analysis
"each case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal
regulatory scheme in question,"'' 3 past precedents do not provide precise
guidelines for interpreting the preemptive scope of a particular statute.
For this reason, my argument for obstacle preemption will be based on
the structure and purpose of the URAA; general, imprecise principles of
preemption doctrine; and the adverse consequences of the alternatives,
rather than the text or legislative history of particular statutory provi-
sions.
A. Preemption Analysis
Most commentators split preemption analysis into two different sets
of categories.14 First, preemption is categorized by its scope into conflict
preemption, obstacle preemption, and occupation of the field preemp-
tion. Second, "[p]re-emption may be either express or implied, and 'is
compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the stat-
ute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.' ",5 In
153. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
154. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-25 to 6-28
(2d ed. 1988); Starr, supra note 137, at 15-30.
155. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
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both cases, "the question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by
federal law is one of congressional intent."'56
1. Conflict, Obstacle, and Field Preemption
Both courts and commentators have acknowledged that the catego-
ries of conflict, obstacle, and field preemption are neither "rigidly
distinct" nor well defined. 57 Some commentators have even argued that
obstacle and field preemption analyses are indistinguishable.' Neverthe-
less, important consequences follow from the way in which a court
categorizes the preemptive scope of the federal law. The most important
difference is that states may not regulate at all in a field occupied by the
federal government. The obstacle standard permits states to regulate so
long as state laws either do not interfere with the federal purpose or ac-
tually promote it.
Conflict preemption is the narrowest of the three. It is the paradigm
example of the operation of the Supremacy Clause. An actual conflict
exists where the state law forbids something that the federal law
156. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) ('The purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone.' (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504
(1978))). However, it is not entirely clear what the textual basis for preemption is in the Con-
stitution. "Although [a preemption] claim is basically constitutional in nature, deriving its
force from the operation of the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, it is treated as 'statutory' for
purposes of our practice of deciding statutory claims first to avoid unnecessary constitutional
adjudications." Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 271-272 (1977). Compare
Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 767-77 (1994)
(arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause, rather than the Supremacy Clause, is the basis
for Congress's power to preempt state law, at least with respect to obstacle and field preemp-
tion) with S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the
Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829 (1992) (arguing that "occupation of the field" pre-
emption is a "second-order" conflict, analogous to the "first-order" direct conflict of the kind
found in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824)).
157. See, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620, 624 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[W]e are
somewhat wary that these ready citations list, but do not describe, and catalog, but do not
define, any real distinctions among the various types of preemption... ).
158. See, e.g., Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HAST-
INGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 82 (1988); Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm:
Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1178-1181 (1998) (Jordan also
notes the similarity of implied and express preemption, classifying obstacle preemption as a
form of implied preemption and field preemption as a form of express preemption). The Su-
preme Court has also acknowledged this criticism. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S.
72(1990).
By referring to these three categories, we should not be taken to mean that they are
rigidly distinct. Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood as a species of con-
flict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with
Congress' intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation. Nev-
ertheless, because we previously have adverted to the three-category framework, we
invoke and apply it here.
English, 496 U.S. at 79-80 n.5.
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requires, or vice versa, so that "compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility."'5 9 Some commentators contend
that because direct conflict preemption is simply the automatic operation
of the Supremacy Clause, congressional intent to override the conflicting
law is either unnecessary or irrelevant.'6o Another interpretation is that
"Congress presumably intends its statutes to be obeyed, despite any state
law to the contrary, so any state law directly conflicting with federal law
is preempted.' 61 Conflict preemption thus differs fundamentally from the
other two types, which require courts to determine whether or not
Congress intended federal law to supersede state laws.
If a federal law preempts only those state laws that actually conflict
with it, states remain free to regulate the same subject matter as the
federal law. The conflict between the state and federal law must be
irreconcilable, such that state law requires individuals or entities to
violate the federal law, for the state law to be preempted.' 62 A conflict
does not exist where the state law merely permits what the federal law
prohibits, or prohibits what the federal law permits.'" Similarly, if a
state law only subjects individuals or entities to liability or otherwise
increases the cost of engaging in activities regulated by the federal law,
the state law does not actually conflict with the federal law. For example,
state tort causes of actions or provisions for punitive damages are
159. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
160. See Gardbaum, supra note 156, at 770-73. See also Starr, supra note 137, at 8-15
(characterizing Gibbons v. Ogden as a case of conflict preemption and arguing that actual,
direct conflicts of state and federal laws differ fundamentally from preemption); Florida Lime
and Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43 ("A holding of federal exclusion of state law is
inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate com-
merce."). That is not to say that Congress could not stipulate that state law might trump
conflicting federal law, which Congress often does through express "Savings Clauses." See,
e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 97 (1992).
161. Walthall, supra note 128, at 721 (citations omitted).
162. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659-700 (1982) (discussing
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) where
the Court held that a state statute facially conflicted with the Sherman Act "because it man-
dated resale price maintenance, an activity that has long been regarded as a per se violation of
the Sherman Act.").
163. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams, 458 U.S. at 659-61 (holding that "[a] state stat-
ute is not pre-empted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have
anticompetitive effect." The Court concluded that a state law "may be condemned under anti-
trust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of
the antitrust laws in all cases.").
164. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996)
(finding no irreconcilable conflict between federal law that permitted certain banks to sell
insurance and a state statute prohibiting them from selling insurance, because "[t]he two stat-
utes do not impose directly conflicting duties on national banks.").
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normally not preempted by federal regulation of a given field,'65 because
it is not physically impossible to comply with both federal and state
laws; it is just more expensive. 66 Other examples are state labeling
requirements that require information in addition to that required by
federal law, 6 state corporate laws that make takeover attempts more
expensive than federal securities laws, 68 or state tax laws.
State laws may also be preempted if they stand as an obstacle to the
purposes of the federal law, even though it is possible to comply with
both federal and state law. A state law stands as an obstacle to federal
law if it has the effect of discouraging conduct or policies that the federal
law was specifically intended to encourage or promote,' 69 or if it has the
effect of encouraging conduct or policies that the federal law was in-
tended to prohibit or discourage.'7 ° For example, where federal laws or
regulations governing banks permit, but do not require, banks to sell in-
surance, state laws prohibiting banks from selling insurance are
preempted.'7 ' State laws also may stand as an obstacle if they disturb the
165. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 82 (1990) (holding that plaintiff's
state cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which resulted from em-
ployer's retaliation against whistleblower employee, and provision for punitive damages were
not preempted, even though Congress had occupied the field pertaining to the "radiological
safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant."). In the absence
of clear congressional intent, "state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they
impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law." Id. at 89.
166. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (state tort remedies for
personal injuries resulting from violation of federal regulations governing nuclear power
plants were not preempted because "[playing both federal fines and state-imposed punitive
damages for the same incident would not appear to be physically impossible.").
167. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540 (1977) (finding that there was no
actual conflict where it was possible to comply with both federal and California law pertaining
to labeling requirements for packages of flour, even though compliance with California law
would be more expensive for out-of-state producers).
168. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 82 n.7 (1987) (finding no actual
conflict with state law governing tender offers, Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Act, which
made tender offers more expensive by imposing procedural requirements over and above fed-
eral law, the Williams Act, even though these additional costs could conceivably deter some
tender offers).
169. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). In Casey the Court held that a state no-
tice-of-claim statute, the purpose of which was to limit governmental liability, conflicted with
the purpose of federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was to vindicate federal
civil rights.
170. See TRIBE, supra note 154, § 6-26 at 485. See also Jones, 430 U.S. at 540-43. In
Jones, the Court held that federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act preempted California regu-
lation because it would frustrate the purpose of the federal law, which was to facilitate value
comparisons among similar products. This purpose was frustrated because the state law in
question had the effect of discriminating against national distributors in favor of local distribu-
tors by requiring national distributors to over-pack.
171. See Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996) (noting
that the Court had traditionally interpreted "grants of both enumerated and incidental 'powers'
to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily
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'delicate balance' created by Congress in areas that are largely, though
not exclusively, regulated by the federal government, such as labor rela-
tions, securities, and environmental laws. 7 1 So long as there is a conflict
with federal policies, it is not necessary that the federal law explicitly
state that it preempts conflicting state law. 
73
Unlike conflict preemption, obstacle preemption allows state laws to
be preempted if they have the effect of burdening federal rights. State
laws can burden federal rights in several ways. First, a state law may act
as a precondition to the exercise of a federal right.' 74 Second, state laws
can discourage individuals from vindicating their federal rights by de-
priving claimants of governmental benefits. 7 Finally, state laws may
preempting, contrary state law.... In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and
regulations granting a power to national banks, these cases take the view that normally
Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power
that Congress explicitly granted."). See also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 158 (1982) (holding state laws prohibiting S&Ls from including a "due-on-
sale" clause in mortgage agreements were preempted. "By further limiting the availability of
an option the Board considers essential to the economic soundness of the thrift industry, the
State has created 'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives' of the due-on-sale regulation.").
172. See Int'l Ass'n. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 n.4 (1976) (holding the National Labor
Relations Act set up a "balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to...
labor disputes .... State law attempted to regulate an area that Congress had determined
should not be regulated at all.); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (finding the federal
Williams Act governing tender offers was designed to protect investors by putting incumbent
management and bidders on equal footing. State law upset this balance by favoring incumbent
management.); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) ("In this case the appli-
cation of Vermont law against IPC would allow respondents to circumvent the NPDES permit
system, thereby upsetting the balance of public and private interests so carefully addressed by
the Act.").
173. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 144 (finding federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, lacked pre-
emption provision). Furthermore, if federal statute has Savings Clause, which expressly
preserves particular types of state laws, the court may infer that state laws not covered by
Savings Clause that conflict with purposes of federal law are preempted. See Gade v. Nat'l
Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 97 (1992); Int'l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 492-93
(1987).
174. See Felder, 487 U.S. at 141. (holding state notice-of-claim statute preempted be-
cause "it conditions the right of recovery that Congress has authorized, and does so for a
reason manifestly inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute: to minimize govern-
mental liability" and because "the notice provision discriminates against the federal right").
175. See Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967). In Nash, the
Court found that a Florida law that deprived persons of unemployment insurance who made
complaints to NLRB of unfair employment practices frustrated the purpose of federal law. The
federal law sought to protect whistleblowers against coercion by private parties and unions,
and this purpose would be thwarted if a state were allowed to take similar coercive actions to
deter whistle blowing.
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withdraw federal remedies.'76 Another example of the difference between
the two types of preemption is the state laws that require individuals or
entities to get permission from state regulatory agencies to engage in
activities regulated by federal law. Where the state law gives a state
agency the authority to veto activities permitted by federal law or agen-
cies, the state law is preempted as an obstacle to federal law.'77
Field preemption is much broader than obstacle preemption. When
the federal government has either explicitly or implicitly reserved a field
for federal regulation, all existing and future state legislation in that field
is rendered invalid.' States are deprived of their power to act at all in a
given area, whether or not state laws conflict with federal laws179 or with
any substantive federal policies.8 Because field preemption causes such
a dramatic redistribution of regulatory power from the states to the fed-
eral government, courts require Congress to give a "clear statement" of
its intent to preempt, either in the text or the legislative history.' In Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,'82 the Court announced that there is a strong
presumption against preemption of fields traditionally regulated by the
States,'8 3 such as services, consumer safety, and health.
Where a clear statement to preempt is lacking, however, the federal
government may implicitly occupy a given field in two ways. First,
courts may infer a congressional intent to occupy the field in areas of
peculiarly federal concern or where the federal government has exclusive
176. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (preempting state workers'
compensation law's exclusivity provision, which operated as 'reverse preemption' clause
withdrawing federal rights).
177. See Edgar 457 U.S. at 639 (holding that Illinois statute governing tender offers pre-
empted because, among other things, it allowed Illinois Secretary of State to pass on
substantive fairness of offer and thereby veto the transaction permitted under federal law).
178. See TRIBE, supra note 154, § 6-27, at 497.
179. See Gardbaum, supra note 156, at 771.
180. See TRIBE, supra note 154, § 6-27, at 497.
181. See Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 108 S. Ct.
1350, 1354 (1988) ("Without a text that can, in light of [legislative history], plausibly be inter-
preted as prescribing federal pre-emption it is impossible to find that a free market was
mandated by federal law."(alteration added)); New York State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405,413 (1973) (quoting Shwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)
[I]f Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It
will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of
the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The
exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.
Id.
182. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
183. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."). As discussed in the introduction, the WTO Agreement
covers many such areas, including financial services, consumer safety, health, and government
procurement. See supra note 8.
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jurisdiction, for example, foreign affairs, copyright, or immigration and
naturalization.'"' Even within these fields, however, exclusive federal
power does not "translate into broad, sweeping preemption of all state
measures that might affect a vital federal interest."'85
Second, courts may infer from the presence of federal regulatory
scheme, enforced by federal regulatory agencies or licensing require-
ments, that Congress intended to occupy the field in question. 6 Field
preemption may be inferred when the federal regulatory scheme is "so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it."'87 The less comprehensive the regulatory
scheme, the less likely it is that courts will find congressional intent to
occupy the field, because of the danger of creating a regulatory vac-
188
uum.
Finally, the inference that Congress implicitly intended to occupy the
field is less likely to be made when the field is one that states have tradi-
tionally regulated, because of the Rice presumption against preemption."'
But if Congress has given a clear statement of its intent and is acting
within the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, it may expressly pre-
184. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (striking down state law re-
quiring aliens to register with state authorities, because "this legislation is in a field which
affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been
most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority.").
185. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding state statute prohibiting em-
ployment of undocumented workers, despite the exclusive federal power to regulate
immigration); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (holding that despite
federal regulations intended to occupy the field of nuclear safety concerns, federal safety regu-
lations for nuclear power plants did not preempt state tort liability laws for injuries resulting
from violation of federal standards).
186. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 634-635 (1973)
(holding that federal statutes, the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control Act, did not
expressly preempt state noise control regulations, but Court found city ordinance preempted
because, first, cases decided prior to passage of Noise Control Act in 1972 had held that the
federal scheme regulating aviation was pervasive, and, second, portions of legislative history
stated that passage of Noise Control Act would "expand the Federal Government's role in a
field already preempted."); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 307 (1988)
(holding that state law requiring natural gas companies to get approval from state regulatory
agency was preempted because it amounted to a "regulation of rates and facilities, a field
occupied by federal regulation").
187. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme is judged
by the comprehensiveness of the governing statute, rather than that of the regulations. See
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985) ("We are even
more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regulations than from the
comprehensiveness of statutes .... To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a
problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency
decides to step into a field, its regulation will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be
inconsistent with the federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurispru-
dence.").
188. See TRIBE, supra note 154, § 6-27, at 497.
189. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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empt any field.' 9° The Tenth Amendment is no more of a restraint on
Congress' power to preempt state law by occupying a given field than it
is on its power to legislate.'9 '
2. Implicit and Express Preemption Analysis
The object of all preemption analysis, whether express or implied, is
to ascertain congressional intent.' 92 What distinguishes the two forms of
analysis is the type of evidence a court will consider in determining con-
gressional intent. When applying implied preemption analysis, courts are
more willing to look to the "structure and purpose of the statute as a
whole,' 93 than they are when applying express preemption analysis,
which focuses on the text and legislative history.
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that in some cir-
cumstances it is appropriate to use implied preemption analysis to
determine the preemptive scope of an express preemption clause such as
section 102(b)(2)(A). The best illustration of this approach is Medtronic
v. Lohr '94 The issue in this case was whether state common-law tort
claims were state law "requirements" preempted by the Medical Devices
Amendment (MDA).'9 ' Lohr was the recipient of a pacemaker manufac-
tured by Medtronic, which Lohr claimed was defective. Medtronic
190. See TRIBE, supra note 154, § 6-25, at 481 ("Since congressional purposes can be ei-
ther substantive or jurisdictional, a state action may be struck down as an invalid interference
with the federal design either because it is in actual conflict with the substantive operation of
the federal program, or because, whatever its substantive impact, it intrudes upon a field that
Congress has validly reserved to the federal sphere'").
191. See id. § 6-27, at 500 ("[An unambiguous declaration by Congress that it intends
to occupy a particular field must be treated as dispositive regardless of the nature of the sub-
ject; state action in such cases is invariably preempted, providing Congress has acted
constitutionally.").
192. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985).
193. See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996); Barnett Bank of Marion County,
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
98 (1992).
194. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
195. The Medical Devices Amendment, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994), contained the fol-
lowing preemption provision:
§ 360k(a). State and local requirements respecting devices.
(a) General Rule. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State
or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter.
Medical Devices Amendment, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
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argued that all state tort claims for products liability were preempted by
the MDA because they constituted prohibited "requirements."
The Court rejected Medtronic's preemption claim on three grounds.
First, because the federal statute regulated consumer safety, an area
traditionally regulated by States, the Rice presumption against
preemption applies absent a clear congressional intent to preempt.
Second, and most importantly, the Court applied implied preemption
analysis to discern congressional intent from the structure of the statute.
Congress' intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the lan-
guage of the pre-emption statute and the 'statutory framework'
surrounding it. Also relevant, however, is the 'structure and pur-
pose of the statute as a whole,' as revealed not only in the text,
but through the reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the
way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding
regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law.
19 6
The Court found Medtronic's construction of the statute inconsistent
with its purpose, because it would have "the perverse effect of granting
complete immunity from design defect liability" to an industry that Con-
gress had determined required stringent regulation to protect the safety
of consumers.97 Finally, the Court relied on the fact that the FDA had
rejected Medtroni'c's construction, because the FDA was the agency to
which Congress had delegated the authority to implement the statute and
was therefore "uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form
of state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' ,,98
B. Obstacle Preemption is Most Consistent with the
Structure and Purpose of the URAA
Because neither section 102(b)(2)(A) nor its accompanying legisla-
tive history specify the scope of state laws preempted by the URAA, its
preemptive scope must be inferred from its structure and purpose. Of the
three possible preemptive scopes, obstacle preemption is most consistent
with the allocation of interpretive authority between the USTR and the
196. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 487.
198. Id. at 496 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Though the
Medtronic Court cited Chevron as support for agency deference, it also cited Hillsborough,
471 U.S. at 714. The Court gave the FDA deference with respect to the interpretation of its
own regulations. Medtronic was asserting that the regulations had preemptive effect, even
though the FDA was arguing that the regulations in question did not preempt state tort law and
were not intended to. The Court was not deferring to the FDA's interpretation of the scope of
authority delegated to it by Congress.
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federal Judiciary established by Congress in section 102(b). Obstacle
preemption allows the USTR and the federal Judiciary to flexibly inter-
pret and implement the URAA, whereas actual conflict and field
preemption do not permit courts or the USTR to exercise discretion or to
base their decisions on policy considerations.
If a conflict standard were to be used, states would be free to impose
additional regulatory requirements,'
99 tort liability,200 or other costs.
20'
States would also be able to permit what the URAA prohibits, and to
prohibit what the URAA permits. 3 Commentators have pointed out a
number of such state laws-including state corporate tax laws, ° labeling
requirements20 ' and state sanctions against Burma 206 -that are probably
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement and the URAA, but do not actu-
ally conflict with them.
Conflict preemption is contrary to both the structure and purpose of
the statute. First of all, if Congress had intended only to preempt state
laws that actually conflicted with the URAA, then section 102(b) would
be superfluous. Conflict preemption is the default level-state laws that
actually conflict with federal laws are preempted by the automatic opera-
tion of the Supremacy Clause, unless Congress expresses the contrary
intent, for example, through a Savings Clause. By including a preemp-
tion provision, Congress declared its intent that a broader form of
preemption was intended. Secondly, and more importantly, this standard
deprives both courts and the USTR of any discretion to factor into its
preemption decision the effect of the state law on federal policies. Where
state law conflicts with federal law, the court must find that state law is
preempted anyway. Where such a conflict is lacking, courts cannot pre-
empt the state law, no matter how detrimental it may be to U.S.
international trade policy.
For the same reasons, field preemption is not consistent with the
structure and purpose of the URAA. The WTO Agreement has
provisions governing a wide range of fields traditionally regulated by the
199. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (labeling requirements).
200. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
201. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
202. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
203. See Bamett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
204. See Julie Long, Note, Ratcheting Up Federalism: A Supremacy Clause Analysis of
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements, 80 MINN. L. REV. 231 (1995).
205. See James T. O'Reilly, Stop the World, We Want Our Own Labels: Treaties, State
Voter Initiative Laws, and Federal Pre-Emption, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 617, 638-44
(1997).
206. See Jennifer Loeb-Cederwall, Restrictions on Trade with Burma: Bold Moves or
Foolish Acts, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929, 958-62 (1998).
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states207 such as trade in goods,208 government procurement, 2°9 consumer
health and safety," ° and services such as securities, banking, and
insurance. "' But nowhere in the URAA does Congress make the clear
statement of its intent to invalidate all state regulation in these fields that
Rice requires. In fact, the SAA specifically provides that the consultation
provisions cover all areas "in which the states exercise concurrent or
exclusive legislative, regulatory, or enforcement authority." These
consultation provisions constitute a tacit acknowledgement by Congress
that states will continue to regulate in these fields. Furthermore, federal
occupation of the field would create a regulatory vacuum.212 Alternately,
it could be argued that Congress has expressed its intent to occupy these
fields implicitly, by creating a pervasive scheme of federal regulation.
However, the URAA does not comprehensively regulate the broad areas
it covers, so there is no reason to infer that Congress intended to occupy
all of these fields. 3
Finally, field preemption leaves no room for courts or the USTR to
exercise discretion. Obstacle preemption on the other hand will allow
courts and the USTR to work together to flexibly interpret the URAA
and to advance its underlying purpose of liberalizing international trade
and removing non-tariff barriers. Furthermore, it allows them to exercise
their statutorily delegated discretion in a manner consistent with their
respective institutional competences.
The obstacle standard allows the USTR to bring its policy expertise
and its national and international perspective to the table. Congress dele-
gated to the USTR the authority to develop, coordinate, and implement
U.S. international trade policy. 4 The USTR thus has both the authority
and the expertise to set the course for U.S. international trade policy and
to determine how best to coordinate and implement the various, and
207. See generally Friedman, supra note 5, at 1448-58.
208. See Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, supra note 8.
209. See Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 6.
210. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 27 (1994), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1381 (1994); Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994), reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 103-316, at 1427 (1994) (regulates packaging and production and may limit states' ability
to protect health and safety of consumers by means of such regulations).
211. See GATS, supra note 8 (covering banking, insurance and securities, as well as pro-
fessional services, such as accounting, engineering, and construction).
212. See TRIBE, supra note 154, § 6-25.
213. The above analysis assumes that Congress has not already expressly occupied the
field in question. Congress is free to occupy fields covered by the URAA with future legisla-
tion, but they have not yet done so.
214. See Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1) (1994).
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sometimes conflicting, policies set by the President and Congress. Fur-
thermore, the USTR has a broader perspective on the impact that
retaliation by other Member States would have on the nation as a whole
and on the United States' relationship with its trading partners.
But section 102(b) also commands courts to independently deter-
mine whether the state law conflicts with federal law. The obstacle
standard allows the court to perform this independent function-Courts
need not second-guess the USTR's policy judgments or findings that
state law impacts federal policy, but it can independently determine
whether state law actually frustrates federal policies, or if, instead, the
state law is neutral with respect to federal policy or even promotes it.
C. Judiciary Not Delegated Authority to Weigh Risk of
Retaliation by other Member States
Before concluding, one objection to my interpretation of section 102
should be addressed. Perhaps the primary policy issue that the USTR
may have to resolve is the conflict between URAA section 102's re-
quirement that it respect and accommodate a state's interest in retaining
its law and the threat to the United States' interests and trading relation-
ships from retaliation by other Member States. In Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Bd.2"5 and Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Bd. 216 the Supreme Court held that the courts are not the proper branch
of government to weigh this sort of risk. In the context of a legal chal-
lenge from the USTR, this would seem to leave courts no alternative but
to defer to the USTR in these matters, in contradiction to my arguments
above.
In Barclays Bank, the Supreme Court held that neither the Executive
nor the Judiciary is authorized to weigh the risk of foreign retaliation
when deciding whether a state law, in this case a California corporate tax
law, should be preempted. Barclays Bank, a foreign corporation,
contended that California's law discriminated against foreign business
and therefore violated the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Attorney General
argued that the United States could face retaliation from foreign
governments if the state tax were not invalidated. The Court first
declared that it was not competent to make such a policy decision. "The
judiciary is not vested with power to decide 'how to balance a particular
risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a
215. 512 U.S. 298, 328 (1994). Before addressing the issue of preemption, the Court dis-
missed the claim that the state tax in question violated the Foreign Commerce Clause by
discriminating against foreign corporations.
216. 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1982).
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whole to let the States tax as they please.' ,,2"7 The Court also denied this
authority to the Executive Branch,2 '8 which had filed an amicus brief
supporting the plaintiff foreign corporation. The Court gave this no
weight, stating that "neither he nor we were to make that decision, but
only... Congress.'21 9
The primary difference between the legal proceedings pursuant to
section 102(b)(2)(A) and the above case, is that the URAA has been en-
acted and the WTO Agreement has been ratified. In terms of the
rationale of Barclay's Bank, Congress has made the decision to delegate
the authority to the federal judiciary and the Executive, specifically the
USTR, to balance the risk of retaliation by other Member States against
state interests. Though the Court specifically withdrew this issue from
the Judiciary in Container Corp. and Barclays Bank, the legal and fac-
tual contexts of these cases were different. There was much greater
uncertainty about the likely responses of our trading partners.220 The
WTO Agreement, however, was designed to reduce uncertainty and to
provide a predictable, rule-based multilateral trading regime with an im-
partial dispute settlement process not dominated by any one Member
State. Unlike the prior regime, the WTO authorizes Member States to
retaliate against other Member States whose laws have been determined
by the DSB to conflict with the WTO Agreement and who have not
217. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328 (citing Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)).
218. See id. at 329-30. The Court did not reject, as a general matter, that the Executive
Branch was entitled to interpretive authority, but rather its holding only applied to circum-
stances similar to those in the case. The Court rejected the argument that a series of Executive
Branch actions, statements, and amicus filings constituted a 'clear federal directive' to pre-
empt state law. The President in the past had proposed legislation and negotiated a treaty that
would have prohibited this form of taxation, both of which the Senate had rejected. Because
Congress had rejected the proposed legislation and treaty, the Court held that "Executive
Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render
unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide
combined reporting." Id. at 330.
219. Id. at 329.
220. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194. The Court stated that it had
little competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be offended by
particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how to balance a particular
risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let
the States tax as they please. The best that we can do, in the absence of explicit ac-
tion by Congress, is to develop objective standards that reflect very general
observations about the imperatives of international trade and international regula-
tions.
Id.
221. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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withdrawn the offending measures within the time frame laid out in the
DSU.2
Though not dispositive, these changes in the legal environment may
allow for a judicial role in evaluating the risk of retaliation by our trading
partners when determining whether state law is preempted. Because the
possibility of retaliation is likely to be present in all USTR legal chal-
lenges to state laws, it would be inconsistent with the clear
commandment of judicial independence in section 102(b) for federal
courts to always find that the challenged state law is preempted when-
ever there is the threat of retaliation, no matter how small its potential
amount.
CONCLUSION
A number of commentators have sought to assess the effects of the
WTO Agreement and Uruguay Round Agreements Act on U.S. and state
sovereignty at a general level.2 3 Others have addressed the more narrow
issue of whether particular state laws, or types of state laws, conflict
with particular provisions of the WTO Agreement. 224 This Note takes a
middle road between these two approaches-evaluating the impact of
the WTO Agreement and its implementing legislation on state sover-
eignty from the perspective of one crucial provision, section 102(b).
Though the analysis presented in this Note is not meant to be a guideline
for determining whether a particular state law or type of regulation
would be preempted, hopefully it will enable some significant and rele-
vant legal conclusions about what section 102(b) means-and more
importantly what it does not mean-to be drawn.
Though section 102(b) sets out in great detail the procedures that
must be followed in the event that the DSB adopts a Panel or Appellate
Body report finding that a state law conflicts with the WTO Agreement,
it is ambiguous as to the level of deference courts must give the USTR
and the preemptive scope of the URAA itself. How these two provisions
are interpreted may, in the future, have a large impact on state sover-
eignty, the ability of the USTR and other federal agencies to implement
U.S. international trade policy, and the federal-state balance in fields that
the WTO Agreement covers. This Note offers an interpretation of the
222. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Aceves, supra note 5; Friedman, supra note 5; Jackson, supra note 5;
Straight, supra note 5; Tangney, supra note 5; Wilson, supra note 5.
224. See, e.g., Loeb-Cederwall, supra note 206 (regarding Massachusetts' Act Regulat-
ing State Contracts with companies doing Business with Burma); Long, supra note 204
(regarding state corporate tax laws); O'Reilly, supra note 205 (regarding California product
labeling requirements).
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provisions of section 102(b) that recognizes the USTR's expertise in the
field of international trade policy, while ensuring that the courts make
their own independent determination of whether or not the state law
should be preempted.
When Congress enacted the URAA, it was aware that there would be
some tension between concurrent state and federal regulation of fields
covered by the URAA, particularly when state laws that conflict with the
United States' international obligations are allowed to stand. 2" Rather
than automatically preempting state laws or giving the USTR the discre-
tion to preempt state laws on its own initiative, Congress responded to
this tension by enacting section 102(b). This provision embodies Con-
gress' policy choice to tolerate this tension between state sovereignty and
the United States' international obligations, and to give the states as
much bargaining power as possible in negotiations with the federal gov-
ernment to resolve the conflict, while still maintaining federal supremacy
in the area of international trade policy. Congress emphatically did not
intend the legal challenge to be a mere formality on the road to preemp-
tion. The challenge for courts in applying section 102(b) in the future will
be to preserve this tension, and their own independence.
225. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) ("No doubt there is
tension between the conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal
law and the conclusion that a state may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of
liability.... Congress intended to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension
there was between them.").
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